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abstract
This article defends Musical Stage Theory as a novel account of the ontology of musical works. Its main claim is that a musical
work is a performance. The significance of this argument is twofold. First, it demonstrates the availability of an alternative,
and ontologically tenable, view to well-established positions in the current debate on musical metaphysics. Second, it shows
how the revisionary approach of Musical Stage Theory actually provides a better account of the ontological status of musical
works.
i. introduction
In our common linguistic practices, we seem to
bear conflicting attitudes toward musical works.
For example, when someone says “Scarlatti’s
Sonata in D minor came after Chopin’s Sonata in
C minor,” she is uttering an acceptable and pos-
sibly truthful sentence if she is talking about the
program of yesterday’s concert but not if she is
referring to the years in which these pieces were
composed. In this and similarly ambiguous cases,
a term apparently devoted to designating a work
of music seems to pick out a sound event (a per-
formance) in one case, but something else (tradi-
tionally, a repeatable entity) in another.
Type-token theorists take the latter as straight-
forward: ‘Chopin’s Sonata in C minor’ refers to
a repeatable entity, that is, the musical work, and
the apparent reference to a performance, that is,
one of the instances of the work, is explained
derivatively, as in “[The performance of] Scar-
latti’s Sonata in D minor came after [the per-
formance of] Chopin’s Sonata in C minor.” At
bottom, this attitude is shared by views other-
wise opposed to the type-token approach. For in-
stance, musical perdurantists consider the work
designated by ‘Chopin’s Sonata in C minor’ as a
perduring entity: performances are temporal
parts, and their fusion constitutes the work of mu-
sic. Nominalists, on the other hand, take it to be a
class of performances. For both of these positions
just as for type-token theories, then, a nonliteral
reading of the sentence above is needed, as in the
assumptionof an implicit “performanceof” caveat
(see Caplan andMatheson 2006, 59–69; Goodman
1968).
The aim of this article is to challenge the con-
cept of musical work that has been taken as a
model by traditional ontological theories and to
turn this focus on its head: the work we refer
to with ‘Scarlatti’s Sonata in D minor’ is liter-
ally the sound event that occurred yesterday after
Chopin’s Sonata in Cminor. It is our apparent talk
about alleged repeatables, then, that needs to be
analyzed and explained from the viewpoint of the
theory that is defended. In so doing, the view that
is proposed gives a promising prominence to the
sonic/performativedimension, a dimensionwhich,
in a sense, has remained as an afterthought in al-
ternative theories. Recognizing the priority of the
sonic aspect of music is one of the main motiva-
tions for my view. This article focuses on music,
but the same approach could straightforwardly be
extended also to other performing arts such as
dance and theater, since they standardly share the
same structure asmusic: a composer/author writes
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the instructions that performers should follow on
a script/score.1
For reasons that will soon be apparent, the view
that I propose is called “Musical Stage Theory”
(henceforth MST):
MST: the musical work is a stage/performance
connected by a privileged relationship to
other stages/performances.
According to MST, then, the work is a perfor-
mance, an event we have sensory access to. From
now on, I will refer to it as a work-as-performance.
Every performance is thus a different work, even
if, as will be explained, the act of grouping perfor-
mances together according to a certain relation-
ship also plays a role in our everyday notion of
musical works.
By identifying works with performances, that is,
with sound events uncontroversially accessible by
the senses, MST accounts for the commonsensical
commitment to the idea that we should be able
to have direct epistemological grasp of musical
works. As argued in SectionV, this is an advantage
exclusive to MST. A second advantage is that of
providing a systematized way of describing the
relationship which stands between performances,
allegedly, of the same “work” through what will
be called the Repeatability-relation.
The significance ofMST is twofold. First, it is in-
tended to show the availability of an ontologically
tenable alternative towell-established views in the
current debate on musical metaphysics. Second, it
also aims to show the independent advantages of
the identification of works and performances.
In the central section of this article, MST is de-
veloped against the background of an indepen-
dently motivated move proposed by Theodore
Sider (1996, 2001) in the ontology of material ob-
jects and persistence. In the final section, I more
tentatively put forth considerations to show that
MST not only is a tenable alternative, but in fact
provides a better account of the ontological status
of musical works than the alternatives currently
on offer.
ii. the legacy of sider’s stage view
The explanation of how MST overcomes certain
apparent difficulties affecting the identification of
workswith performances takes as its starting point
an analogy with certain aspects of Sider’s meta-
physics. The comparison with Sider’s Stage View
is particularly promising for MST since it suggests
an encouraging strategy for overcoming prima fa-
cie shortcomings of MST. This section describes
the points of contact and contrast between Sider’s
view and MST as well as the benefits which result
from this theoretical connection.
Sider puts forward his Stage View in dialectic
confrontation with other accounts of persistence,
namely, endurantism and perdurantism, with the
aim of providing a more satisfying solution to the
puzzle cases of identity over time (Sider 1996,
433). Endurantists describe objects as enduring
or three-dimensional entities which are “‘wholly
present’ at all times at which they exist” (Sider
2001, 3). Enduring objects do not have distinct
temporal parts; instead they occupy in their en-
tirety each of the momentary spatiotemporal re-
gions through which they persist. On the other
hand, perdurantism adopts a four-dimensional ap-
proach and claims that objects persist through
time by perduring, that is, by having different
temporal parts. Objects are thus described by
perdurantists as four-dimensional worms made
up of the sum of different spatiotemporal
stages.
The Stage View, in contrast, claims that or-
dinary objects such as people are instanta-
neous spatiotemporal stages. They are not three-
dimensional entities as endurantists contend; yet,
they are also not four-dimensional continuant
objects which perdure through time, by having
temporal parts at each of these times as perdu-
rantists claim. I suggest that a move parallel to the
one that Sider makes from perdurantism to the
Stage View can be made within musical ontology.
In doing so, I place myself in direct dialogue with
musical perdurantism, which advocates the appli-
cation of a rival theory of persistence, namely, per-
durantism, to the ontology of musical works. MST
maintains, in agreement with musical perduran-
tism, that musical works are concrete entities but
holds that they are not, contra the perdurantist, fu-
sions of temporal parts. Rather, MST claims that
the work is a single performance/stage connected
by a privileged relationship to other appropriate
stages/performances.
For Sider, the referent of a singular term such
as ‘Elizabeth II,’ namely, Elizabeth, is an instanta-
neous spatiotemporal stage, which does not ex-
tend through time. Rather, it is related by a
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counterpart relation to certain other past and fu-
ture stages. These aspects of Sider’s view also pro-
vide a fruitful framework for the development of
my main thesis. In particular, according to MST,
(1) musical works are spatiotemporal stages, just
as ordinary objects are in Sider’s view; (2) stages
are connected by a unity relation which is de-
scribed as a relation between counterparts similar
to Sider’s counterpart relation (the I-relation); (3)
although ‘Chopin’s Sonata in C minor’ refers to
a performance-stage, a systematic shift analogous
to that invoked by Sider supports certain other
readings of sentences involving that term; (4) as
in Sider’s analysis of reference to people, this shift
is contextually modulated, in a sense that will be-
come clearer later on.
One caveat before continuing with the anal-
ogy: Sider’s stages are instantaneous while per-
formances are temporally extended. This is not,
however, a stumbling block for the analogy: as
Katherine Hawley points out in her interpreta-
tion of the Stage View, a salient temporal interval
may well be established, which allows us to set the
boundaries of the stages according to our interests
(see Hawley 2001, 59ff.). A performance-stage, in
the sense relevant for MST, can thus be described
as the sum of all the instantaneous stages that con-
stitute a sound event, the salience of which is de-
termined by the complete performance, from the
first to the last note prescribed by the composer’s
instructions.2
Sider’s account reaches a prima facie impasse
when dealing with temporal properties. For in-
stance, intuitively, “I was once a baby” seems like
a true description of my past; yet, for Sider, this is
not a true attribution of a past property to myself,
since, strictly speaking, the occurrence of ‘I’ in that
sentence refers only to my present stage. In order
toovercome this difficulty, Sider appeals to an idea
which, in its general form, will also play a central
role in MST: for Sider, the relation between any
stages of a single person (understood as person-
worm, as will soon be clear) is privileged in respect
to the relation between stages of distinct persons.
For example, “my”baby stageor “my”20-year-old
stage bear some sort of privileged relation to my-
self (that is, to “my” present stage) than to other
objects, such as the number two or my mother’s
30-years-old stage.3 Sider calls this relation the “I-
relation”: “If we accept the Stage View, we should
analyze a tensed claim such as ‘Tedwas once a boy’
as meaning roughly that there is some past person
stage, x, such that x is a boy, and x bears the I-
relation to Ted” (Sider 1996, 437). The I-relation,
thus, provides a way to explain how certain dis-
tinct stages are linked together more closely than
others.
However, despite taking the basic entities of
our ontology to be instantaneous spatiotemporal
stages, Sider’s Stage View also appeals to aggre-
gates of stages or worms. This is necessary for
Sider to explain how, in our talk, we sometimes
seem to employ singular terms so as to refer not
to instantaneous stages but to certain collections
of stages. This happens, for example, when we ask
how many people have been sitting at this desk
for the last hour. Assuming the Stage View, our
reply should be “infinitely many stages.” But here
Sider proposes a “partial retreat” from the strict
claim of the Stage View: “The stage view should
be restricted to the claim that typical references
to persons are to person stages. But in certain cir-
cumstances, such aswhenwe take the timeless per-
spective, reference is to worms rather than stages”
(448). The difference between Sider’s view and
perdurantism stands in the fact that, despite allow-
ing for the existence of four-dimensional worms,
Sider refuses to identify them with persons and
objects in general (444).
Interestingly, especially when it comes to some
aspects of MST discussed below, this shift is con-
textual and interest governed. In addressing the
issue of counting coinciding objects, Sider claims
that we can attribute different meanings to the
same predicate depending on the speaker’s inter-
ests. To illustrate this point, Sider partially mod-
ifies Lewis’s example of coinciding roads. Sup-
pose Jane wants to reach the farm and she asks
us how many roads she must cross to get there.
Jane and the farm are divided by a winding road
and, in order to avoid misunderstandings, our an-
swer should be “three” even if the “three” roads
are connectedmiles away with each other. Instead
of referring to the road, in this case we refer to
road segments to facilitate our talk (440–441). For
Sider: “The predicate ‘road’ does not always ap-
ply to ‘continuant’ roads—it sometimes applies to
road segments” (441). The “harmless indetermi-
nacy” (Sider 2001, 199) which is implied by this
relativization involves a contextualist analysis of
the truth value and of the target of the speaker’s
utterance. This is analogous to a contextual attri-
bution of meaning to the predicate ‘person’: while
often it applies to person stages, it sometimes also
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applies to worms, for example, when we take a
timeless perspective (190).
Having summarized these aspects of Sider’s on-
tology, I now proceed to the development of its
analogue in musical ontology, MST.
iii. musical stage theory
The I-relation between stages allows stage theo-
rists to comply with our ordinary talk about ob-
jects: what I strictly speaking am, that is, a present
stage, is for Sider interestingly related to “my”
previous stages, thereby allowing for everyday at-
tributions as in “I was once a baby.” Similarly,
MST provides an account of certain features of
our talk about works by appealing to a privileged
relation among performances (that is, for MST,
strictly speaking among different works).
Every work-as-performance is related to its
counterparts through an ontologically important
relation: the Repeatability-relation (henceforth
R-relation), which, as we shall see, reflects the
sort of intuitions that type-token theories explain
in terms of exemplifiables and their instances. So,
although a work (say, Chopin’s Sonata in C mi-
nor) is a performance-stage, this work is related
to other performances-stages by means of a privi-
leged R-relation, parallel to Sider’s I-relation.4
According to MST, the R-relation as a privi-
leged “horizontal” relation between different en-
tities explains what is commonly understood as
repeatability, that is, as a “vertical” relation be-
tween awork-type and its exemplars.5 For this rea-
son, much of what traditional theories hold about
the work-performance relationmay be adapted to
the alternative ontological outlook promoted by
MST. I propose the following as components of
the R-relationship:
1. a causal relation which links the works-as-
performances together and/or which connects
the works-as-performances to the relevant act
of composition,
2. the performers’ intentions to play precisely
that performance, and
3. a sufficient degree of similarity between the
works-as-performances.
As I explain in more detail below, we appeal to
these requirements differently in different con-
texts when speaking of musical works.
The causal relation mentioned in (1) has
two aspects: it is a relation between works-as-
performances (for instance, betweenAzhkenazy’s
and Lilya Zilberstein’s performances “of”
Chopin’s Sonata in C minor) and also a rela-
tion between performances and acts of composi-
tion (say, between Zilberstein’s performance and
Chopin’s composition).6 So, it is by virtue of, say,
Zilberstein’s acquaintance with Azhkenazy’s per-
formance or with Zilberstein’s and Azhkenazy’s
common historical relation with Chopin’s act of
composition that both events are described as per-
formances “of” Chopin’s Sonata in C minor.7
According to requirement (2), the connection
between performances involves the performer’s
intentions: theperformer intends to initiate a sonic
event precisely by virtue of the causal connection
in (1). So, what is required is not only Zilberstein’s
acquaintance with Azhkenazy or her historical
connection with Chopin, but also her intention
that these relations guide her performance. Inci-
dentally, this condition is also essential not only
to support the causal relation described above
but also to rule out cases of unintentional perfor-
mances such as the scenario of the wind blowing
through the canyon (see Wolterstorff 1980, 74).
Lastly, the similarity mentioned in (3) requires
that all suitably R-related performances share at
least certain aspects of a sonic (harmonic, rhyth-
mic, and melodic) profile.8 Here as before, the de-
tails remain negotiable, since their specification is
not an exclusive burden of MST: for anyone, sup-
posedly, therewill be vague limits, at somepoint or
another, where an utterly incompetent execution
ceases to be a performance of anything.
It is worthy of note that, as a consequence to the
approach presented above, MST’s assessment of
the R-relation is contextual: a sound event qual-
ifies as (what we would commonly call) a perfor-
mance ofW if and only if it satisfies a contextually
salient collection of R-desiderata. The R-relation
between performances or stages may intelligibly
depend upon contextual factors, such as the inter-
ests of the speaker or themusical background that
she takes to be appropriate. Thus, a sound event
may qualify as an instance of W notwithstanding
its peculiar sonic profile in some settings (unde-
manding student recitals, or even arrangements
and adaptations) but not in others.
In the previous section I mentioned how the I-
relation allows Sider to account for our references
to apparent continuants, such as when someone
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says “I was once a baby.” Thanks to a similar strat-
egy, theR-relation allowsMST to explain our uses
of terms such as ‘Chopin’s Sonata in C minor’ in
ways that do not seem to refer to a single work-as-
performance, but rather to a collection of perfor-
mances. This explanation, parallel to Sider’s ap-
peal to worms, highlights a further sense in which
the R-relation is contextual.
I already discussed a first sense in which the R-
relation is contextually assessed: the links that we
establish between performances depend on the
context and on the speakers’ interests. In other
contexts, furthermore, we might not want to refer
to performances at all. For example, when some-
one says “I enjoyed Chopin’s Sonata in C minor
yesterday night,” she refers to a performance-
stage, that is, according to MST, to what strictly
is the work. Yet, in other cases she adopts a ‘time-
less perspective’ and asserts that “Chopin’s Sonata
in C minor was performed many times in the late
nineteenth century in Paris.” In this case, what is
at issue is a talk directed toward a collection of
R-related stages: suitable stages/performances of
it took place in Paris. So, while in the first exam-
ple the person refers to the work-as-performance,
that is, strictly speaking, the work, in the second
example she is referring to what onemight call the
work-as-construct.
The work-as-construct is correlated to the
work-as-performance just asworms are correlated
to stages in Sider’s view. According to MST our
terms for works primarily refer to stages, that is,
performances. Yet, MST also grants that our lin-
guistic attitudes systematically shift between the
level of discourse about works-as-performances
to that of discourse ostensibly directed toward
the work-as-construct. The work-as-construct is
indeed a collection of performances, as well
as of information we have in respect to the
“work,” such as provenential and historical infor-
mation, information on performing traditions, and
so on.
It follows that, on the basis of the ontologi-
cal theory proposed, sentences about works-as-
constructs do not involve reference to any sin-
gle entity. Thus, we need to analyze the sentence:
“Chopin’s Sonata inCminorwas performedmany
times” in a different way: this sentencemeans that
Chopin’s Sonata in C minor (the relevant stage)
has the tensed property “having been performed
many times” by virtue of there being many previ-
ous stages Sn, such that (1) Sn have the property
“being performed” and (2) Sn are R-related to the
present stage.
As a result, the shift between work-as-
performance and work-as-construct allows MST
to paraphrase apparently problematic statements
such as: “Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is a great
work but you wouldn’t know it from last night’s
performance.” The concern with how to para-
phrase it may stem from the fact that, apparently,
the sentence is showing a mismatch between the
evaluation of the “work” and of “last night’s per-
formance,” thus recognizing them as two separate
entities, a distinction which is rejected by MST.
MST can accommodate this by resorting to the
shift of reference between work-as-performance
and work-as-construct. While the first part of the
sentence is referring to the value of the work-as-
construct (in relation to Beethoven’s corpus, the
history of music, and so on), the second part of
the sentence is referring instead to the properties
of thework-as-performance. The incompetence of
some performers does not undermine theworth of
the work-as-construct but just that of the work-as-
performance.
Thus far I have been talking about the reference
for terms for musical works (such as “Scarlatti’s
Sonata in D minor came after Chopin’s Sonata
in C minor”) and its shifts, but I have done so
mostly from a metaphysical viewpoint: what was
of interestwas the status of their referents, as inmy
discussion of work-as-performance and work-as-
construct. Still, the idea of shifts of reference may
also raise semantic considerations that need to be
addressed. Just like in Sider’s view, where ‘person’
sometimes refers to a stage and sometimes to a
worm, in MST ‘work of music’ sometimes refers
to a stage, that is, the work-as-performance, and
sometimes to the work-as-construct.
Note first that the claim is not one of acciden-
tal ambiguity. The relationship between the in-
terpretations of the linguistic uses of the term is
clearly systematic. It is so in my account to no
lesser extent than in traditional accounts (which,
as indicated, need to reanalyze ‘Chopin’s Sonata
in C minor’ as ‘a performance of Chopin’s Sonata
in C minor’ in some cases). A similar method-
ology applies to cases of presumed co-reference.
Suppose we say: “Yesterday, Beethoven’s Fifth, a
masterpiece of the Classic period, occurred after
the Brandenburg VI.” In this sentence, the par-
enthetical clause identifies Beethoven’s Fifth as
a masterpiece of the Classical period which, over
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here, anachronistically always comes before the
Brandenburg VI.
The problem is that, if these are cases of co-
reference, either Beethoven’s Fifth is a work dat-
ing back to the Classical period or it was com-
posed before the 1700s. But note first that this
is as much a problem for alternative ontologies
of musical works. It is, furthermore, a problem
for pretty much any traditional account of other
one–many scenarios: it is relatively uncontrover-
sial that ‘novel’ has a work reading and a physical
object reading, but that we can say, for example,
“Austen’sEmma, a beloved masterpiece, is on the
top shelf.” The problem is there, but it is a purely
semantic issue.9
iv. objections to musical stage theory
This section addresses a few lingering objections
to MST. The first concern is that, if musical works
are performances, then compositions which are
never performed do not deserve the status of
musical works. This concern is legitimate: unper-
formed compositions are not musical works for
MST. However, this does not preclude ordinary
assertions about so-called unperformed composi-
tions as works being at least loosely speaking true.
Think of what we would commonly call an un-
performedwork—suppose that Bobwrites a score
named Blue Carpet which never gets performed.
Plausibly, Bob would not be willing to followMST
in claiming that, strictly speaking, Blue Carpet is
not a work because it still has not been performed.
Bob’s concern is understandable. It is indeed true
that by looking at a score, even people who are
only scarcely musically literate are able to get
some information about the piece. For instance,
they can know whether the piece is short or long,
which instruments it calls for, whether the struc-
ture is simple or complex, and so on. Yet, Blue
Carpet according toMST, is not a work ofmusic. It
is, nevertheless, a “would-be work.” In particular,
many among those with an access to Bob’s score
would understand the shape “it” (that is, a per-
formance that follows that score) would take. Al-
though not a work, Blue Carpet bears all the char-
acteristic features of something that provides the
conditions for the existence of a particular work—
that is, for the realization of a performance.10
Indeed, the sense inwhichMSTdealswith cases
such as Blue Carpet may once again be further
clarified by an analogy with Sider’s theory. He
addresses a similar problem when he takes into
consideration sentences about stages that do not
presently exist, for example “Socrates was wise.”
The sentence ‘Socrates was wise’ cannot be a de re tem-
poral claim about the present Socrates-stage since there
is no such present stage. Nor can we take it as being
about one of Socrates’s past stages, for lack of a distin-
guished stage that the sentence concerns. What we must
do is interpret the sentence as a de dicto temporal claim.
Syntactically, the sentence should be taken as the result
of applying a sentential operator ‘WAS’ to the sentence
‘Socrates is wise’; the resulting sentence means that at
some point in the past, there is a Socrates-stage that is
wise. (Sider 1996, 450)
Sider thus interprets these sentences as de dicto
claims to which sentential operators are applied.
I will call Sider’s strategy the “operator-strategy.”
This move is analogous to the application of the
modal operator ‘possibly’ in modal counterpart
theory: “According to counterpart theory, an ob-
ject, x, has the property possibly being F iff some
counterpart of x in some possible world has F. . . .
The temporal operator ‘was,’ and ‘will be’ are anal-
ogous to the modal operator ‘possibly’” (Sider
2001, 194).
MST can apply a similar operator-strategy to
account for sentences which refer to unperformed
works. Instead of using the modal operaftor ‘pos-
sibly,’ I use the operator ‘in potentia.’ So, werewe
to say, for instance, “Blue Carpet is an example of
choral counterpoint,” when Blue Carpet is a com-
position that has never been performed, our con-
versational contribution amounts to the claim that
“in potentia Blue Carpet is an example of choral
counterpoint,” that is, Blue Carpet has the poten-
tiality of being an example of choral counterpoint
in the future.Even ifBlueCarpet cannot at present
be considered a musical work byMST, since there
is no performance ‘of’ Blue Carpet available, still
its composition creates the conditions for a per-
formance to exist in the future and, thus, for Blue
Carpet to be a full-fledged work.
The application of the modal operator ‘in po-
tentia’ is functional for accounting for unper-
formed compositions as ‘would be’ works. In this
way, MSTmanages to preserve the commonsensi-
cal attribution of the label ‘work’ to unperformed
compositions and, at the same time, to explain it
without detracting from its main claims. In this
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respect, MST fares better than musical perduran-
tism, which faces the challenge of explaining how
an empty fusion of performances can still be called
a “work.”
The second concern that needs to be addressed
is related to the compliance of MST with the com-
monsensical feature of the creatability of musi-
cal works.11 Indeed, MST’s central claim, that the
work is the performance, counterintuitively en-
tails that a work is created when its first note is
played and it ceases to exist when the last note
fades out. Interestingly, the strategy that is re-
peatedly applied to defend MST against previous
objections can once again yield its fruit. For in-
stance, the claim we ordinarily express by saying
“Chopin’s Sonata in Cminorwas created in 1828”
means that Chopin’s Sonata in C minor (the rele-
vant stage) has the tensed property “having been
created in 1828” by virtue of a previous stage S,
such that (1) S has the property “occurring in
1828,” (2) S is R-related to the present stage, and
(3) no other R-related stage occurs prior to S.
Admittedly, this account yields the conclusion
that Chopin’s Sonata in C minor can truly be de-
scribed as being created at the time of its first per-
formance, that is, of S. This account of creatability
could still be considered unsatisfactory if, as com-
mon sense perhaps intimates, the creation of the
work is identified with its act of composition and
notwith its first performance. Indeed, according to
MST, barring cases in which an act of composition
consists in a full-fledged performance, the com-
position is merely a set of instructions necessary
to performers in order to transform it into sounds
but which by itself is not sufficient to qualify as a
stage/work.12
Nevertheless, even if it cannot be recognized as
a work, the relevance of the act of composition is
unquestionable: without it, it would be impossible
to originate a sequence of performances, that is,
of works. In this sense, the act of composition is
part of the work-as-construct, since it is part of
the set of provenential information that we have
in regards to the “work.” Here, as in the case of
unperformed compositions, I can apply the modal
operator strategy and add the operator ‘in poten-
tia’ to the sentence at issue. MST can thus grant
that when we say “Chopin’s Sonata in C minor
was created in 1828,” meaning that it was com-
posed and not performed in that year, we are ap-
plying the operator ‘in potentia’ to our sentence:
“Chopin’s Sonata in C minor was in potentia
created in 1828.” Whatever came to light in 1828
is not a full-fledged performance, but it has the
potentiality of becoming a stage as understood in
the austere sense.
Indeed, MST fares better than its direct ri-
vals, type-token theory andmusical perdurantism,
in addressing the creatability of musical works.
The desideratum of creatability has proven to be
particularly problematic given the type-token ac-
count of musical works as eternal abstracta. The
type-token theorists typically reply that we do not
need to thinkofmusicalworks as creatable entities
but instead as stemming from an act of creativ-
ity. However, this claim encounters well-known
difficulties.13 Musical perdurantism does not fare
better in this respect: the identification of musical
works with fusions has the counterintuitive conse-
quence that musical works come into being when
the first performance is played.14
By resorting to the shift to the work-as-
construct, MST manages to acknowledge the rel-
evance of the act of composition. In addition, the
adoption of the modal operator strategy allows
MST to explain in a systematized and consistent
way the role of the act of composition as creation
in potentia and the case of unperformed compo-
sitions as would-be works.
v. advantages of musical stage theory
It has already been shown that MST is an onto-
logically tenable alternative to other theories in
musical ontology. In this section, the aim is to pro-
vide some preliminary reasons for thinking that
MST is not only an alternative but a better alter-
native. There are two main advantages of MST:
(1) it straightforwardly accounts for our episte-
mological grasp on musical works, and (2) it ac-
counts for the widespread relevance that we give
to performers in musical practice and in our ev-
eryday interactionwithmusic. This advantage par-
tially derives from the appeal to the R-relation,
which provides a systematic strategy for overcom-
ing prima facie shortcomings of MST and also
allows for greater flexibility in referring to works
and performances.
As mentioned in Section I, one advantage of
MST is that it straightforwardly accounts for ex-
pressions such as “Yesterday I listened toChopin’s
Sonata in C minor” thanks to the identification
of musical works with performances. The main
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ontological views currently on the market at best
justify this accessibility by recognizing a sort of
indirect epistemic contact with the work and by
a heavy-handed rephrasing of common expres-
sions. Type-token theorists strive to account for
the grasp that we can have of the work by positing
a kindofmediated (and arguably notwell defined)
relation of hearing a work-type through its tokens
(seeWolterstorff 1980, 56ff.; Kivy 1993; and Dodd
2007). The traditional type-token view claims that
listening to a performance and being aware of
its properties is sufficient to have a grasp on the
essential nature of the work itself. However, the
main objection that type-token theorists need to
face is that, as abstract entities, works cannot enter
causal relations and possess audible properties.15
At best, they can enter causal relations deriva-
tively, along the lines of Quine’s “deferred osten-
sion”: the individuation of tokens suffices for the
individuation of the related type, so that “it is pos-
sible to listen to a work of music by listening to
one of its performances” (Dodd 2007, 12).Despite
securing a way to handle the type-token relation,
though, what the type-token view cannot secure is
the direct access to the work which common state-
ments such as “Tonight I listened to Beethoven’s
Fifth Symphony” seem to imply.16
Indeed, even materialistically oriented views
such as musical perdurantism struggle in this re-
spect.According tomusical perdurantism,musical
works are fusions of temporal parts where these
temporal parts are performances. When listening
to a performance, then, we are listening only to a
part of the work: it is impossible to hear works-
qua-fusions in their entirety; only their temporal
parts are accessible (Caplan and Matheson 2006,
61–63).17 Nominalists and action theorists meet
similar issues: neither a class of performances nor
the composer’s actions can typically be objects
of acquaintance on the part of the audience (see
Goodman 1968 and D. Davies 2004). Instead, the
identification of works and performances posited
by MST straightforwardly accounts for our access
to the work: we have direct grasp of the work by
listening to it.
A second advantage of MST consists in ac-
knowledging the importance of musical practices
and of performers for the nature of works. This ad-
vantage derives from its appeal to the R-relation.
In previous sections, the R-relation is presented
as the relationship which holds between different
performances and that underwrites claims about
those performances being of the same “work.”
MST thus adopts the same strategy for explain-
ing our shift of reference from the work-as-
performance to the other uses of the term ‘work’
and for grouping performances together.
Analogously to Sider’s use of multiple unity re-
lations to explain puzzles of identity over time, the
multiple requirements of the R-relation show that
there is no single way to classify performances.
It depends on the speaker’s interests whether we
should identify a performance as a performance
“of” Chopin’s Sonata in C minor on the basis of
the intentionality requirement even if it contains
mistakes, idiosyncratic embellishments, and other
departures from the score. Note that the afore-
mentioned contextuality need not (and is not) a
question of “tolerance,” as when we adopt a cer-
tain lassaiz faire in the exemplification of a type
(as, say, in the case of a badly scribbled letter
‘A’). It is, rather, part and parcel of MST’s ac-
count of the very nature of the metaphysics of
musical works and of our ensuing ways of talk-
ing about music. In this sense, MST may perhaps
stand in a better position than traditional type-
token theories: at least as long as a musical work
is being identified with a single type (as traditional
type-theories allege), any deviation from the con-
straints of the type may well be tolerable, but are
nevertheless a source of defectivity.18
The contextuality envisaged by MST is not a
tolerance of departures from fixed standards,19
since univocal standards are nowhere to be found.
There are no invariantly incorrect performances:
each performance should be analyzed following
distinct and contextually assessed criteria. In this
way MST is nearer to the actual (and admittedly
fuzzy) practices of reception: each one of us has
a slightly different opinion on how and when a
performance is correct, and it is hard to say who
is right and who is wrong.
MST gives the concept of musical work a new
meaning, better suited to interpreting widespread
musical practices which are neglected by other
theories. The ordinary concept of work that we
refer to when making claims such as “Chopin’s
works have been performed many times,” and
which is assumed by type-token theorists as the
model of musical work, is arguably a legacy of the
late nineteenth-century fashion of isolating what
was deemed art from other expressions of human
creativity.As a result, whenwehear someone talk-
ing about a work of Classical music, the idea that
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pops into our minds is that of an entity that ought
to be reproduced by respecting the composer’s in-
structions and the performing tradition associated
with it.20
The lens of the “Classical music” tradition has
been the medium through which both musicolo-
gists and theorists of the ontology of music in-
terpreted the concept of musical work. But the
immutability and the aura of untouchable author-
ity which emanated from the works as commonly
intended is distinctive only of a very limited pe-
riod of time in the Western tradition. Before and
after that, the work of music was interpretedmore
as a flexible entity: from the Early Music practice
of thoroughbass and partimenti, through accom-
panied music in the Early Classical period, up to
more modern styles such as jazz, a component
of improvisation and unexpectedness has always
been at the heart of music. Unsurprisingly, then,
traditional theories struggle to account for impro-
visation in their ontological framework because
of its ephemeral nature. MST as an account for
the ontology of musical works is instead able to
seamlessly include musical improvisations within
its framework.21 Improvisations are not lessermu-
sical works than performances based on a set of
instructions. What counts for something to be a
work, in fact, is that it is a sonic product, inten-
tionally created and performed, and which is im-
mediately graspable by a potential audience. In-
deed, in their immediateness, improvisations are
musical works par excellence. The performance is
not only a means to an end, where this end is the
work as an abstract entity. The performance is the
means and the end of music.
vi. conclusion
In this article, MST was proposed as a novel ac-
count of the ontology of musical works and as
an alternative to other views. The proclaimed
aims of MST are to be ontologically defensible
and to explain the reasons behind our seemingly
inconsistent linguistic attitudes toward musical
works. Ontological tenability was reached by ap-
pealing to an independently motivated account
given by Sider in the ontology of space-time: the
Stage View. Section II showed how a parallel with
Sider’s view is beneficial for MST to explain both
the relationship between performances and the
shifts of reference occurring in our language. The
latter takes place between the talk of the work-as-
performance—what for MST is, strictly speaking,
the work—and the speech aimed at the work-as-
construct. As explained above, the rationale be-
hind this shift of reference is also central for re-
plying to possible objections against MST.
In addition to being a plausible alternative to
other theories in the ontology of musical works,
MST also appears to be a better alternative. MST
has the advantage of straightforwardly accounting
for our epistemological access to musical works.
Furthermore, the revision of the concept of mu-
sical work that it promotes has the favorable
consequence of including different musical prac-
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1. The same approach could less straightforwardly be
applied to other multiple-instantiation artworks such as po-
etry, literature, and etching.Here, indeed,wehave amaterial
object which instantiates the work, not a performance as in
the case of performing arts. Thanks to an anonymous referee
for pointing out the necessity of drawing this parallel.
2. I refer here generally to the composer’s instructions
so as not to exclude cases of compositions which do not
result in a fully written-out score.
3. Sider’s analysis of tensed claims is analogous to
David Lewis’s modal counterpart theory. The temporal op-
erators used by Sider to explain how, for example, despite
being a stage, I was once a child, are analogous to the modal
operator ‘possibly’ used by Lewis to say that, despite being
five feet tall, I could have been six feet tall. (See Sider 2001,
194–195.) I return to the application of modal operators
within MST in Section VI.
4. My R-relation should not be confused with Lewis’s
R-relation. Lewis distinguishes the R-relation from the I-
relation in his Survival and Identity (Lewis 1983, 58–60),
where theR-relation refers to themental continuity between
person-stages and the I-relation to the relation which holds
between the stages of a continuant person.
5. In this respect, then, MST follows Christy Mag
Uidhir in his proposal of replacing the standard notion of
repeatability with the notion of “relevant similarity” (2013,
165–197).
6. What I mean for causal relation between score and
performance is that, barring the availability of other sources,
the score is necessary for the performance to take place. The
relation between score and performance is then a counter-
factual relation of the form “If score S were not available,
the performance Pwould not have occurred.”Regarding the
causal relation between works-as-performances, instead, I
refer to particular cases in which a performer is not per-
forming from a score, but she is recreating a performance
that she has listened to in the past. Also in this case the
relation is of counterfactual dependence: “If the act of lis-
tening to P did not occur, the performance P1 would not
have occurred.”
7. It is necessary here to point out an important dis-
tinction between the causal connectedness posited by the
R-relation and the one posited by the I-relation. In the case
of performances, it is possible for two performances A and
B to be independently connected to the act of composition
without being causally dependent one upon the other (for
example, the performer of A need not be familiar with the
performance of B). In the case of the I-relation for con-
tinuants, instead, each stage is connected with the previous
ones, and stages from different branches are not connected
despite having the same source. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for pointing out this disanalogy.
8. For a debate between pure and timbral sonicists, see
Kivy (1993) and Dodd (2007).
9. I will not enter the debate on which semantic theory
is best to account for similar cases.On this seePredelli (2011)
and Dodd and Letts (2017).
10. There is a parallel here with naming and possible
individuals in David Kaplan (1973). See also Salmon (1998)
and Kripke (1980).
11. For an overview of the main views on this topic, see
Kivy (1993), Dodd (2007), Levinson (1980), and Caplan and
Matheson (2006).
12. An analogy: reading the leaflet with the instruc-
tions to assemble a table may well be essential for giving
the scattered pieces the shape and functionality of a table,
yet we would not sit around the leaflet to have dinner with
our friends. The same holds true for musical works: a mu-
sical work is a sum of sounds performed by respecting the
instructions provided by the composer; it is not the compo-
sition itself.
13. See Kivy (1993, 38). See also Caplan andMatheson
(2004, 128) for an objection against Dodd’s view about the
noncreatability of musical works. Levinson tries to get rid of
the unpleasant consequences of the type-token view regard-
ing creatability by identifying musical works with initiated
types, that is, with types individuated by an act and a con-
text of composition in addition to a sound structure. This
proposal, however, manages only to show that works are
“brought into being,” while their sound structures are al-
ready existing before the composer actually wrote them on
the score (see Levinson 1980, 7).
14. A possible reply in defense ofmusical perdurantism
is that it can make a parallel move. But I do not think that
musical perdurantists can be in the position for doing this.
First, the last version of musical perdurantism (see Caplan
and Matheson 2006) includes within the fusion, that is, the
work, only performances (while in the first version (2004)
it also included the act of composition). The authors do not
account for the reason of the exclusion and it never men-
tions the relevance of the act of composition. In addition,
the application of a modal operator strategy would not be
consistent with the overall method of musical perdurantism
as it is instead for MST.
15. It should be mentioned that not all type-token
theorists take types to be eternal and uncreated, though.
See, for example, Levinson (1980), Wolterstorff (1980), and
S. Davies (2001).
16. In addition, Dodd’s view on types raises indepen-
dent concerns as pointed out by Caplan and Matheson
(2004, 126–128; see Caplan and Matheson 2006 for objec-
tions against Dodd’s version of deferred ostension).
17. Caplan and Matheson’s ultimate, and arguably not
well supported, reply is that “a Perdurantist about Musical
Works . . . is no worse off here than a Perdurantist about
Persons is” (2006, 63). I will not dwell too much on the
shortcomings of the rivals of my account and focus on the
positive side of the view. For more details on perdurantism
versus Platonism, see Dodd (2000).
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18. Admittedly, a contextual assessment of the correct-
ness of performances and of their belonging to the group of
“performances ofworkX” is also allowed by this view.Many
type-token theorists, for example, grant that in order for a
performance to be an instantiation of a type, it just needs to
“fulfill an adequate number” of the criteria of correctness
(Kivy 1993, 51). (See also Dodd 2007, 32; Levinson 1980,
26; and Wolterstorff 1980, 76.) Still, the flexibility granted
by type-token theories is allowed only within the sphere of
what is deemed a “correct” performance. A referee sug-
gested that type-token theorists may adopt an alternative
strategy. They could say that we refer to different sorts of
types on different occasions: sometimes types are connected
by one sort of relation, and sometimes by another. Despite
leading to a proliferation of types, this may indeed be an
option type-token theorists can take for advocating for con-
textuality. I thank the referee for the remark.
19. As in Peter Unger’s (2002) contextual approach to
‘flat’: in many everyday scenarios, much counts as flat from
the purposes of the conversation.Yet, ‘flat’ is absolute, in the
sense that something is strictly flat iff it is perfectly deprived
of bumps.
20. For a discussion on the concept of musical work in
history, see Kenyon (1988), Goehr (1992), and Butt (2002).
21. For an overview on the topic see Lewis and Piekut
(2016).
22. This work was supported by the Arts and Human-
ities Research Council, United Kingdom (grant number
1504272). I would like to thank the editors and anonymous
referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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